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**Moving through the political participation hierarchy:  
A focus on personal values**

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# **Moving through the political participation hierarchy:**

## **A focus on personal values**

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### **Abstract**

This study empirically explores the determinants of political participation. Using recent data from the European Social Survey (2010/2011), we investigate the relationship between political participation and personal values, via use of the Schwartz (1992) values inventory. Political activities are categorised into levels of participation (none, weak, medium, strong) based on the cost of participating and how unconventional the activity is. A generalised ordered logit model is applied, and finds that individuals that are more open to change and more self-transcendent, are more likely to participate. Furthermore, the patterns of influence (with respect to the majority of individual characteristics) are not monotonic in nature, as you rise through the levels of political participation, highlighting some key areas that future research could tackle. These findings are important for researchers and policy makers who may be interested in understanding determinants of, and/or enhancing the level of political participation in an economy.

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## 1. Introduction

Well-functioning democracies must have citizens who participate in the political environment of their country (Alesina & Guiliano, 2009). Such participation isn't limited to voting (whether in local or national elections), but could involve a range of participatory activities that relate to the electoral system and types of activities that are more direct in nature, such as protesting, or working in a political organisation for example. Stutzer & Frey (2006) also argue that participation in the political process is expected to increase ones' life satisfaction. Even when empirically correcting for the endogenous relationship between political participation and life satisfaction, Pacheco & Lange (2010) also find that political participation has a statistically significant impact on life satisfaction (based on data from the 2006/7 wave of the European Social Survey). Furthermore, Davidson & Cotter (1989) find that political participation is important in developing a sense of community. Teorell (2006), Rosenstone & Hansen (1993) and others also discuss the number of ways that individuals gain utility not just from the outcome of participation, but from the actual process of participating itself. Therefore, with the intent of upping the level of political participation, such that the democratic process operates efficiently, and with the added expectation that increased participation raises the utility of the individuals involved, understanding the key determinants of participating in the political process hierarchy is key.

This study will investigate the determinants of political participation, with a focus on an individual's personal values. General research on determinants of political participation is substantial, and there are a number of studies that look at the importance of political values and personality, in terms of their influence on the political process (See Feldman (2003), Gunther & Kuan (2007), and Gerber et al. (2011)). However, there is limited research on the influence of basic personal values that underlie political values. Furthermore, the majority of past studies, including the few that look at personal values (See Schwartz, Capara & Vecchione, 2010), are focused on how values play a role on which way someone will vote and which ideology they will hold, as opposed to what effect values have on a person's likelihood to participate in the political process. Another gap in the empirical literature on this front is investigating why people participate in some types of activities as opposed to others (Leighley, 1995; Rooij, 2011). Specifically, what moves people to first go from non—participation to participation in the conventional electoral system and other relatively un-

costly activities and then what moves people to go beyond just this into more unconventional, extreme and costly forms of participation (i.e. moving through the political participation hierarchy).

Given the apparent gap in the literature with respect to focussing on personal values and the limited evidence on investigating movement through different levels of political participation, this study aims to investigate the determinants of political participation using the 2010/2011 wave of the European Social Survey. The role that particular personal values play will be examined via the use of the Schwartz (1992) values inventory with a focus on two value dimensions: openness to change vs. conservationist and self-transcendent vs. self-enhancement. To pinpoint the differences that exist in the influence of explanatory variables as we move through the political participation hierarchy, we construct a dependent variable with four possible outcomes: no participation, weak participation, medium participation and strong participation. Considering the ordered scale nature of this variable, a Generalised Ordered Logit model is utilised in this analysis, which clearly identifies whether coefficients on predictor variables change when the outcome variable shifts between the different levels of political participation.

The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 will review the literature on political participation determinants and highlight key explanatory variables required for the forthcoming empirical analysis; Section 3 will detail the data sourced from the most recent wave of the European Social Survey and outline the methodology to be employed; Section 4 will report the results and interpret the key findings from the statistical analysis and, Section 5 will provide concluding remarks, with possible further directions for this research.

## **2. Literature review**

### ***Conceptualising Political Participation***

There has been much debate on how political participation should be defined and what type of activities should be considered to be political participation. Importantly, as both Teorell (2006) and Dalton (2008) point out, how one defines political participation depends strongly upon what theory or model of democracy one believes exists and what one believes is the role

and power of a citizen. For example, in a purely representative democratic model, one in which direct input from individuals and an ability to influence decisions between elections are not possible, a citizen only has the power to influence who is voted in during elections. In this type of democratic model, any other type of participation would be irrelevant, as they would have little meaningful political implications. Alternatively, if a more direct-democratic model is applied, a much wider range of participatory activities must be considered, such as protesting and boycotting, along with a much broader definition of political participation.

Theorists, such as Schumpeter (1942) and Sartori (1987) adhered to a more purely representative model. This position is one that Teorell (2006) criticizes as being extreme and elitist, due to the implications of such a model being that citizens would have very little ability to participate in political decision making, outside of simply voting representatives in. Early studies on political participation only considered types of activities that would fit in with this type of purely representative democratic model. For example, Campbell et al. (1954) and Berelson et al. (1954) only used variables such as whether the individual voted, if they assisted in a campaign, if they attended political meetings and other activities that relate specifically to the election process. From this perspective, political participation must be defined very narrowly as only actions that influence the election process.

A broader and more common definition in the literature stems from Verba & Nie (1972, p.2):  
*“acts that aim at influencing the government, either by affecting the choice of government personnel or by affecting the choices made by government personnel.”*

For example, Kaase & Marsh (1979) and Parry et al. (1992) include activities such as contacting politicians, campaigning, voting, community activities, etc. Furthermore, Salisbury (1975) and Conge (1988) question whether political participation is only relevant insofar as it relates to a country’s government. For instance, Salisbury (1975, p.325) argues that actions “outside the system” should be considered, and along these lines, Giddens (2009, n.p.) states that “the scope of politics is broader than that of government”.

Finally, some theorists argue that an important aspect of political participation is participation in political discussions or deliberation (Conover et al., 2002; Teorell, 2006). Even if it is assumed that an individual only has the power to influence voting outcomes, others have the potential ability to influence how that person will vote and if they will even vote at all.

Therefore, participating in political discussions with others must be considered when conceptualising political participation. Conover et al. (2002), Teorell (2006) and Fearon (1998) emphasize that this type of participation should be termed as discussion rather than deliberation. This is because the term discussion highlights the fact that participation entails activities that involve a collective and as it clearly separates participatory activities that have to do with developing opinions rather than earlier ones discussed that involve decision making processes.

Given the range of activities political participation can encompass based on prior theoretical reasoning, it is plausible that we risk losing the value and explanatory power of this outcome variable if defined too broadly (Conge, 1988). However, if the various types of political participation are categorized effectively, and separated into different levels of participation, these risks are mitigated. Consequently, identifying the appropriate categories each activity fits into is the next step of this study and clearly of paramount importance.

### ***Types of Political Participation***

It can be seen from the earlier discussion that there are many different ways in which people participate. Furthermore, there is likely to be very different outcomes resulting from each type of participation and variances in the antecedents that lead to people participating in different various activities. Rooij (2011) indicates that it is important to correctly categorise the various types of participation in order to fully understand what causes people to become politically engaged and in order to view whether different people engage in different types of participation and why, or if it is the same people participating in all types. However, there must be a strong rational argument (grounded in theoretical expectations) as to why certain categories, or dimensions, are chosen. Furthermore, given the potentially broad nature of political participation, many theorists have come to argue that one dimension is not enough, but rather stress the need for a multidimensional approach (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991). As alluded to in the introduction, this study will take a multi-level approach with four levels of participation. Two dimensions are employed when creating this set of dependent variables – conventional vs. unconventional, and high vs. low cost.

As the definition for political participation broadened, an early and popular way of categorising types of participation was to split activities into conventional vs. unconventional

(Milbrath, 1981; Barnes et al., 1979). This dimension essentially contrasts more traditional and institutional types of participation with activities that may be viewed as more direct or extreme in nature. The latter involves engagement that exceeds and/or goes against social and cultural norms<sup>1</sup> (Krampen, 1991; Barnes et al., 1979).

Traditional forms of participation include activities such as voting, community activities and involvement, electoral activities and contacting representatives. Unconventional activities range from legal activities, such as protests and boycotts, to illegal ones, such as damage to property, violence and illegal strikes. Following on from the earlier discussion, this dimension also distinguishes between types of participation that adhere to a more representative democratic system and types that would be seen in a more direct-democratic model of democracy.

Many studies have focussed on the impact of the level of resources individuals have, in terms of time, money and civic skills, in determining level of political participation (Brady et al., 1995). The more of these resources that an individual has, the less costly it is for them to participate, which thereby increases their likelihood of participation. As Rooji (2011) explains, resource-poor individuals will find it more difficult to participate in any activity, and increasingly difficult to partake in high cost activities (in terms of time, money, energy and commitment) such as working for a political campaign or participating in a strike. Clearly, the level of resources an individual has will play less of a role when it comes to less costly activities like voting and signing a petition. Therefore, considering the importance that resources have in the political process and the differing level of resources needed to participate in some activities over others, Milbrath (1965), Rooji (2011) and others advocate the use of a dimension that separates high-cost activities with low-cost activities.

### ***Role of personal values in political participation***

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<sup>1</sup> Other researchers, such as Van Deth (1986), have made use of a similar dimension but categorised it as illegal vs. legal. However, Sabucedo & Arce (1991) disagree with using these terms as it implies negative connotations with the more unconventional types of participation.

This study will focus on the role that personal values, as a psychological predisposition, has on determining political participation. Personal values can be defined as: “learned beliefs that serve as guiding principles about how individuals ought to behave” (Park & Guay, 2009, p.676). They operate as an individual’s guidelines for how they wish to act and affect the behavioural choices that one makes. This is in contrast to personality, which relates more closely to the sub-conscious behaviours and actions one naturally makes. While there are some correlations between the types of personalities that people hold and their personal values, there are many differences in the way in which they affect a person’s motivation, incentives and other attitudes (Park & Guay, 2009). It is worth noting that the personal values that one holds have been shown to be quite similar to those held by others of the same culture (Meglino & Ravlin, 1998).

While the research on personality and political participation has been fairly extensive, research on the relationship between personal values and participation is still somewhat limited, particularly when it comes to empirical analyses (Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). Furthermore, much of the values research in the political science literature focuses on certain political values that individuals hold, such as equality, patriotism and civil liberties. This is as opposed to looking at personal values, which Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione (2010) argue underlie and mitigate political values.

Inglehart (1977; 1990) has also provided some insightful research into this area, focussing on a particular dimension of personal values, namely post-materialism vs. materialism. Materialists “tend to be preoccupied with satisfying immediate physiological needs” whereas post-materialists are fairly content and generally look to put their energy into more remote and external concerns (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002, p.6). Their analysis indicates that materialists are more likely to participate through conventional electoral means, whereas post-materialists are expected to participate more in unconventional acts, such as protesting and boycotting. Inglehart also predicts that individuals with post-materialist values are growing and consequent to that, participation through unconventional means is becoming more common.

The most commonly used model of personal values is the Schwartz (1992) values inventory, which has been shown to be relevant across a variety of cultures, time horizons and political



contexts (Purkayastha, Schwartz & Davidov, 2011). The Schwartz (1992) model encompasses ten broad basic personal values, as shown in Figure 1 (these are further defined, with reference to the European Social Survey in Table 1). The ten personal values do have a degree of overlap, and therefore can be categorised into four “higher order” values: (i) openness to change, (ii) conservation, (iii) self-transcendence; and (iv) self-enhancement. From this, two dimensions become apparent: openness to change vs. conservation and self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement (Schwartz, 2010).

< Insert Figure 1 about here >

It is hypothesized that those who have more conservative values would be less likely to participate, particularly in unconventional types of participation, than those who are open to change. Those who are open to change would be expected to be more confident in trying out new, unconventional types of participation and in pushing for a difference, whereas conservative individuals may only participate through the conventional electoral process and mainly to ensure that the current social structures remain intact.

In terms of the second dimension of personal values, self-enhancement vs. self-transcendent, it is possible that an individual that places more emphasis on self-enhancement, may be less motivated to participate in the political process, due to the minimal perceived impact that they would have on an outcome that specifically benefits themselves (Olson, 1965). Additionally, an individual that values self-enhancement is also likely to be further deterred by the opportunity costs associated with increasing levels of participation. On the other hand, an individual who values self-transcendence and who cares about benefiting others, may be more likely to participate in political activities.

While the literature investigating empirically the relationship between personal values and political participation is scant, a notable study is that by Besley (2006). He made use of an early wave of the European Social Survey (2004) and investigated the relationship between personal values, entertainment television and political participation. Using factor analysis, they found evidence that openness to change and self enhancement increased the likelihood of participating in political activities. However, the focus of their overall research was not investigating this further, but analysing the impact of entertainment television, for which they

found a higher exposure to this media was associated with decreased participation for most value types. The contribution of this study, relative to Besley (2006), will be three fold: (i) Make use of recently released data from the European Social Survey (2010/2011) (ii) Investigate the impact of personal values across various levels of political participation, and (iii) allow differences in influence of the covariates at different levels of participation (this will be possible via the use of a generalised ordered logit model).

### **3. Statistical analysis**

#### ***Data***

The data utilized in this study is the fifth wave of the European Social Survey (Edition 2.0) conducted in 2010/2011 (ESS, 2012). This cross-sectional survey encompassed 50,781 individuals across Europe on a range of demographic, psychological, social, economic and political issues. Individuals below voting age were removed from the data set, and this therefore involved purging the sample of any individuals below 18 years of age. After then accounting for any missing information in key independent variables, the final sample consisted of 29,829 individuals, from the following countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovakia, and Ukraine.

The ESS data presents a rich source of information, with which to construct the dependent variable, for the purposes of this study. Based on the concepts outlined in Section 2 with respect to how conventional and costly the political activity is, a hierarchy of participation can be created. The levels of participation range from none, to low, medium, and strong. Political participation is therefore an ordered categorical variable coded one to four, where one signifies no participation, and four equates to strong participation. To fall into category one (no participation), the individual will have reported not partaking in any political activity. Weak participation includes people who have done the conventional, electoral and relatively low-cost acts of voting and/or wearing a campaign badge. Medium participation encompasses individuals who have boycotted and / or signed a petition. These activities are still relatively low-cost acts, but tend to be considered to be a little unconventional, thus requiring the individual to go slightly beyond previously held cultural norms (Rooij, 2011). Contacting a

politician, government or local government official was also considered under the spectrum of medium political participation. Such acts do appear rather conventional, but the cost of such acts tend to be higher and therefore more resource intensive. Finally, taking part in a lawful public demonstration and working in a political party or action group were both considered to be indicators of strong political participation, primarily due to the high resource and opportunity costs involved. While working in a political party or action group may take more time and require more skills than demonstrating, the latter is considered ‘strong’ alongside working in a political party or action group due to its unconventional nature. Table 1 provides definitions, sample means, and standard deviations of the political participation variable (as well as for the sub-categories within this dependent variable), along with the covariates employed in the forthcoming empirical analysis.

< Insert Table 1 about here >

As shown by the mean values for the different categories of political participation in Table 1, there is a little overlap across the categories, as the cumulative mean is greater than 1 (specifically 1.215). We do not expect the categories to be mutually exclusive and the purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics that first lead people to participate at all, and then to see what characteristics lead them to participate in higher levels of participation. It would not be surprising if those that participate in strong activities are also involved in weak and medium ones. It would be expected that as acts become more costly and more unconventional, participation in them would become rarer. Indeed, it can be seen that while close to 78.8% of the sample participate in weak activities, only 33.7% are involved in medium activities, while less than 10% are involved in strong activities. 16.6% of the sample did not participate in any type of activities, including voting.

The remainder of Table 1 illustrates the covariates to be employed in this study. These can be broadly grouped under the categories of socio-demographic characteristics, indicators of recruitment and mobilisation, psychological predisposition, and the core variables of personal values. Socio-demographic (SES) variables often highlight the resources<sup>2</sup> that one has or lacks when it comes to participation. Therefore, those who are lower on the SES scale would

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<sup>2</sup> Brady et al (1995) develops a resource model of political participation. The focus is on specific resources, beyond SES, such as money, time and civic skills. Using American data, and a two-stage least squares analysis, the authors show resources have a strong impact on political participation.

be expected to participate less and at lower levels (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Uslaner, 2003; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). Standard SES variables include age, gender, education, household income. Based on research by Blakely, Kennedy & Kawachi (2000), an indicator for health of the individual is also included, and Rooij (2011) motivates the inclusion of a dummy variable for immigrant status.

While SES variables are one cluster of drivers of ability and willingness to participate, individuals may still not participate unless they are asked to. Uslaner (2003) points out that for many people, simply asking is not enough and that many of those people participate only when organised and mobilised to do so by others. Therefore, recruitment and mobilisation is a potentially important set of determinants of political participation, and as such five proxy variables have been included in this study to capture this. Specifically, a six-point Likert scale indicator for how often a person meets socially ('social meet') and a religious activity indicator (i.e. measures of an individual's informal ties) were employed as controls in the forthcoming empirical analysis. Several studies have found mobilisation through religion to be imperative (See Uslaner (2003), Marshall (2001), and Verba et al (1995)), and in particular more effective at incentivising greater levels of participation when aimed at minorities (Harris, 1999; Markus, 2002). Additionally, a dummy variable indicating whether the individual lives in an urban area is expected to capture the greater access to various associations that can mobilise individuals to participate in political activities (Teorell et al., 2007). Two other variables representing mobilisation are marital status and union membership (Norris, 2002, Rooij, 2011). Both of which are associated with increased likelihood of participating at higher levels of political activities. For instance, in descriptive statistics across the political participation hierarchy<sup>3</sup> it can be seen that 49.34% of those that weakly participate are union members, and this increases to 51.9% in the category of strong participation.

While past literature (Uslaner (2003), Teorell et al (2007)) has provided analysis concerning the influence of resource and mobilisation factors on the likelihood of participating, this study will add to that body of work, by investigating the differential impacts that mobilisation has across various levels and dimensions of participation.

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<sup>3</sup> Results not reported here, but can be obtained from the author upon request.

Table 1 also provides the sample means for psychological predispositions based on trust, life satisfaction and political interest. It has been argued that if one were completely rational, they would not bother participating in political activities because the outcomes that they can achieve on an individual level are most often relatively very insignificant (Olson, 1965). More recent studies have pointed out the incentives and benefits that one can receive from participating are not limited to the outcomes achieved, but also through utility gained from the processes involved (Stutzer & Frey, 2006; Teorell, 2006; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). For example, some individuals may enjoy the excitement of being involved in the political process (Teorell, 2006), it gives other individuals an opportunity to express and reaffirm their identity (Calvert, 2002) and some become incentivised by social norms, such as a sense of duty to their society (Knack, 1992). Apparent from this is that many incentives do exist for individuals to participate, although whether they respond to those incentives or not depends on the psychological predispositions that they hold. These attitudinal predictors include political efficacy, political and social trust and political interest. Unsurprisingly, individuals who are interested in politics and who thus become more involved in political discussions and follow political news are much more likely to participate (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). However, care must be taken when interpreting this relationship as there is a likely endogenous relationship between the two, with greater political participation also leading individuals to becoming more interested (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012). In terms of political efficacy, those who are more confident in their ability to understand the political system and in their ability to shape political outcomes are more likely to participate, as those who have lower efficacy are likely to feel that their efforts would be in vain (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Teixeira, 1992). This also means that, indirectly, those who are more politically informed, such as through news media, are more likely to participate as their confidence in their understanding of the political process would be enhanced (Uslaner, 2003).

The level of trust that one has for others around them and for their government or political system has also been shown to be an important determinant of political participation (Rooji, 2011; Belanger & Nadeu, 2005; Hadjar & Beck, 2010; Kaase, 2007). Social trust is believed to be indirectly important as it leads people to be involved with other people and organisations, thereby enhancing the mobilisation effect (Inglehart, 1990; Kaase, 2007). With respect to political trust, those who trust their country's political system, their representatives and their government have more confidence that their input into the political process is

worthwhile and are therefore more likely to participate, particularly in the electoral system (Belanger & Nadeu, 2005; Hadjar & Beck, 2010). Contrarily to social trust however, those with lower political trust have been found to participate at greater levels through direct, unconventional means (Rooji, 2011; Norris, 1999). Given the possible high level of correlation between the two trust indicators (*Social trust* and *Trust in parliament*), the latter of these variables was orthogonalised with respect to the former, to reduce the impact of multicollinearity on the empirical results and to ensure that each of the variables are contributing a unique aspect within the overall trust domain. A final important psychological predisposition is life satisfaction. Those who have greater life satisfaction are more predisposed to participate on an impact level almost as great as the effect that education has on participation, although it is still unclear whether this relationship is direct or whether it is mediated by other variables (Flavin & Kaene, 2011). Furthermore, this is another relationship that has been shown to be quite endogenous, with greater participation leading to increased life satisfaction (Pacheco & Lange, 2010).

### ***Personal values data***

Table 1 lists the personal values indicators that are used in this study. There are 21 variables that encompass the 10 basic values structure proposed by Schwartz. Each variable is ordinal and categorical in nature, ranging from 1 to 6, where 1 indicates that the individual believes the statement is “Not at all like me”, and 6 equates with “Very much like me”. Given the high correlation between the variables (as alerted to by Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov (2011)), principal component analysis is used to capture two orthogonal dimensions: openness to change vs. conservatism (opposing self-direction and stimulation values to security, conformity and tradition), and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence (opposing power and achievement values to universalism and benevolence values).<sup>4</sup> The first two components under each domain had eigenvalues above 1, and are therefore employed as key independent variables in the forthcoming analysis. Specifically, the first two components under the realm of openness to change vs. conservation (*open1* and *open2*) explained 47% of the variation in this index, and under the domain of self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement, the first two components (*self1* and *self2*) explained 52% of the variation.

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<sup>4</sup> The two Hedonism indicators were excluded, due to the large crossover that this category has with both openness to change and self-enhancement. This was similarly done in Ramos, Vala, Duarte, and Lopes (2005).

## ***Methodology***

Given the ordered nature of the categories for political participation (none, weak, medium and strong), a possible econometric tool to employ for the purposes of investigating determinants of moving through the ranked levels of participation is an ordered logit model. Such a methodology would take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. This is also known as the proportional odds model, where one equation is estimated over all levels of the regressand, with the only difference being in the intercepts (cutoff points). One of the limitations of the ordered logit model is therefore that it assumes ‘parallel regression lines’, in that the coefficients have the same effect at all levels in terms of increasing the probability of moving up a level of political participation. For example, in assuming fixed threshold values, we would need to assume that the influence of variables such as high household income is similar in direction and magnitude whether considering the movement from none to weak political participation, or for that matter medium to strong participation. On a number of counts, the literature review gives a strong theoretical warning that the parallel lines assumption is conceptually difficult to justify. For example, while lack of political trust is expected to deter electoral turnout, and hence have a negative impact on weak levels of political participation; such mistrust may have the reverse impact at higher levels of participation. For instance, Norris (1999) points to the potential for alienation with a political regime to increase protest politics and foster unconventional activism. Consequently, a formal test of parallel regression lines was run, and the chi square test produced a highly significant chi squared value, indicating the need to reject the null hypothesis of the proportionality assumption. Based on these findings, a Generalised Ordered Logit Model (gologit) is implemented as the core econometric tool within this analysis to account for threshold random heterogeneity. This model will allow for some of the coefficients to differ for the various outcomes of the dependent variable, while some are able to remain the same. Furthermore, the results allow for useful and relevant interpretations, in that results are shown for each dependant outcome relative to lower levels of the dependent variable. The general specification for the gologit model is:

$$Pr(Y_i \geq j) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + X_{1i}\beta_1 + X_{2i}\beta_2 + X_{3i}\beta_3)}{1 + \{\exp(\alpha_j + X_{1i}\beta_1 + X_{2i}\beta_2 + X_{3i}\beta_3)\}}, j = 1, 2, \dots, M - 1$$

Where Y (political participation) can take on the values of 1, through to M, which in this case is four (none, weak, medium and strong participation).

#### 4. Results

A gologit model is employed with the data outlined in Section 3, where the dependent variable has four levels of political participation, and the vector of independent variables include all controls defined in Table 1 (socio-demographic, and mobilisation / recruitment characteristics, as well as psychological predispositions) as well as the two principal components produced for each of the personal values dimensions (*open1*, *open2*; and *self1*, *self2*). When fitting a gologit with these data, a series of Wald tests are first conducted with each variable to see whether the coefficients differ across thresholds (i.e. whether the variable meets the parallel lines assumption). If the test is insignificant<sup>5</sup> for one or more variables, the variable with the least significant value on the Wald test is constrained to have a fixed effect across thresholds, and the model is then refitted with these constraints. This process is continued until there are no more variables that meet the parallel lines assumption. At which point a global Wald test is conducted to compare the final estimated model with the original unconstrained version to ensure that the final model does not violate the parallel lines assumption. As the results in Table 2 show, ten constraints have been imposed on the final model, corresponding to five variables being constrained to meet the parallel lines assumption – medium income, high education, minority, trust, and *self1*.

< Insert Table 2 about here >

To interpret coefficients from Table 2, the first panel contrasts no participation with weak, medium and strong levels of participation; the second panel contrasts no and weak participation with the medium and strong levels; while the third panel contrasts no, weak and medium participation with strong. In general, the positive coefficients indicate that as the relevant independent variable increases, the more likely that the respondent will be in a higher category of Y than the current one; and negative coefficients indicate that the higher

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<sup>5</sup> Parallel lines assumption tested using the 0.05 level of significance.



the value of the independent variable, the greater the likelihood of the respondent being in the current or lower category. Additionally, to literally interpret the impact of the explanatory variables, odds ratios were also calculated, and are provided in Table 3.

< Insert Table 3 about here >

As evidenced in Tables 2 and 3, in most cases (for 19 out of 24 variables) the parallel regression lines assumption did not hold. In particular there are interesting trends evident when comparing panel (1) with panels (2) and (3). This is because the first panel is capturing determinants of moving from no participation into some form of participation, whereas the latter panels capture something quite different – the determinants of moving through the participation hierarchy. For example, in terms of the socio-demographic characteristics, the gender variable illustrates the possible different influences depending on where on the political participation ladder an individual is located. The negative coefficient (significant at the 1% level) in panel (1) indicates that males are more likely to stay in the no participation category, relative to females. Specifically, the odds ratio of 0.879 indicates that males are 13.77% ( $1/0.879$ ) less likely to move out of the no participation category, relative to females. However, the positive coefficients (significant at least at the 5% level) in panels (2) and (3) indicate that once the individual is participating in the political process, males are more likely to move up the steps from weak to medium, and to strong; relative to females.

The findings for age indicate that the older someone is, the more likely they are to move from non-participation to participation. When it comes to the higher order participation categories, those that are younger actually have a greater likelihood of moving up to participate in stronger activities. The argument that Norris (2002) puts forth for this is a generational effect between participating in conventional compared to unconventional activities. Specifically, those that are younger are not likely to perceive more extreme and direct means of participation as ‘unconventional’ and may even prefer these methods of participation.

Consistent with previous findings by Brady et al. (1995) and others, education appears to have a strong impact in terms of increasing the likelihood of participating and moving to higher levels of participation. For instance, relative to the control group of low education, individuals with a medium level of education are 19.5% more likely to move up from no

participation, 37.8% more likely to move upwards from weak participation, and 27.2% more likely to move up from medium participation. The impact is larger when considering individuals with high education. For this variable, the parallel-lines assumption holds, and across all categories of participation, having high education (relative to low), results in an individual being 89.4% more likely to move to a higher order of participation. These findings for education are expected and relate largely to the necessary civic skills and other non-physical resources that people need in order to participate (Brady et al., 1995)

Both medium and high incomes, relative to low household income, appear to have a positive and significant impact on increasing the likelihood of moving up the participation hierarchy. Interestingly, medium income appears to have a greater statistical and economic impact on political participation. This is an expected result, in that higher household income implies a higher opportunity cost when participating in political activities. This is possibly evidenced by the decreasing odds ratios for high income when moving from panel (1) through to panel (3). A similar finding is made with respect to the employment status of the respondent.

It is interesting to note that while being a minority has an insignificant impact on political participation (odds ratio of 0.999 across all panels), being an immigrant has a strong and negative influence on the likelihood of participation. In particular, an odds ratio of 0.408 in panel (1) implies that an individual is more than twice as likely (relative to non-immigrants) to remain in the mode of not participating; an odds ratio of 0.768 and 0.781 in panels (2) and (3) indicate that the individual is 30% and 28% less likely to move up from weak and medium participation, respectively. These empirical results corroborate research by Rooij (2011) and Uslaner (2003), who also indicate that being an immigrant has a detrimental effect on an individual's likelihood to participate.

Having good health has shown up as being an important predictor of moving from not participating at all to participating in any activity. However, it appears to have no significant influence when moving through to higher levels of participation. A possible explanation for this is that health is only relevant insofar as someone's health is bad enough to prevent them from participating all together.

The next section of Table 2 and 3 present the coefficients and odds ratios relevant to recruitment and mobilisation indicators. The majority of the mobilisation variables (except

for urban status) appear to have positive impact on the likelihood of participating in political activities, which is consistent with the expectations from the literature review discussion on these factors (See Uslander, 2003; Brady et al., 1995; Rooij, 2011; Hodgkinson et al., 1992). For example, belonging to a union increases the likelihood of moving upwards from no participation by 44.7%, relative to non-union members. Additionally, attending regular religious activities also increases the probability of moving beyond no participation by 44.8%.

The one unexpected finding is the impact of the urban status variable. The odds ratio in panel (1) of 0.826 is significant at the 1% level and implies that individuals in urban areas are 21% less likely to move upwards from this participation category, relative to individuals in rural areas. However, the impact is reversed when viewing the odds ratio in panel (3), as it indicates that being in an urban area increases the likelihood of moving from medium to strong participation by 12.3%, relative to rural individuals. This result is also significant at the 1% level, and once again indicates the importance of not assuming parallel regression lines across all levels of political participation. It is possible the former result is due to other mitigating variables capturing the impact of urban status on political participation, whereas the latter result is in line with expectations that protests tend to be held in areas of high population where they are more accessible and effective. Given the non-monotonic nature of the impact of many of the mobilisation variables across the political participation hierarchy, further research could delve into the possible mechanisms at play here.

In terms of psychological predispositions, social trust appears to have a positive and significant impact on participation in political activities. The impact is also constant across the participation hierarchy (odds ratio of 1.117, significant at the 1% level). This finding is in line with the literature (Inglehart, 1990; Kaase, 2007), as participation entails at least some form of interaction with other people, thereby requiring a degree of trust. Political trust on the other hand has a significant and positive impact in panel (1), but insignificant in panel (3). More research is needed in this avenue, to understand further why increasing levels of trust in parliament does increase the likelihood of moving upwards from no participation, but not from medium participation. Political interest appears to have the greatest economic significance out of all of the variables, with odds ratios ranging from 1.984 to 2.634 in panels (2) and (1) respectively. Intuitively, this makes sense since it greatly increases the incentive

for one to both participate and to have a greater understanding of both the political process and of how to participate (Hadjar & Beck, 2010). However, caution needs to be taken when interpreting the influence of political interest, as well as life satisfaction, due to the potential endogenous nature of these variables, in terms of their relationship with political participation (Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012).

### ***Significance of personal values***

The first two variables under the personal values domain (*open1* and *open2*) reflect the openness to change vs. conservatism domain, where a higher value of these variables indicates the individual is closer to the openness to change end of this continuum. The significant odds ratios (all greater in value than one) show that individuals more open to change are more likely to move up the political participation hierarchy. For example, the odds ratio of 1.237 for *open1* illustrates that individuals that are more open to change (i.e. higher value responses to questions regarding self-direction and stimulation) are 23.7% more likely than conservative individuals (i.e. higher value responses to security, conformity and tradition) to move upwards from weak political participation. It should also be noted that *open2* indicates a rising influence of these personal values when moving up through the levels of political participation. The argument behind this is that those who are more open to change and less conservative are expected to have a similar inclination to participating in weak activities (hence the low odds ratio of 1.027 for *open2* in panel (1)), but the likelihood of participating in stronger and more unconventional methods of participation will be much greater for these individuals (hence the rising odds ratios of 1.139 and 1.160 for *open2* in panels (2) and (3) respectively).

The next two variables of *self1* and *self2* reflect the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement domain, where a higher value of these variables indicate that the individual is close to the self-transcendence end of this continuum. Those who are self-transcendent (i.e. higher value responses to questions on universalism and benevolence) as opposed to self-enhancing (i.e. higher value responses to questions on power and achievement) are more likely to move up the political participation ladder. Unlike *self1*, where the impact is unvarying across the categories of participation, the influence of *self2* is non-constant. An individual that is more self-transcendent as opposed to self-enhancing is 10.3% more likely to move upwards from

no participation; 26.9% more likely to move higher than weak participation; and 14.6% more likely to move from medium to strong political participation.

Overall, these findings provide strong empirical evidence that personal values, and in particular these two value dimensions proposed by Schwartz, are powerful determinants of whether someone will participate and whether they will go beyond just participation into higher levels of participation. It is also important to note at this point that similar analysis was conducted at a disaggregate level by gender (results not reported here) and the same patterns were evident for both males and females, with respect to the role of personal values and their impact on political participation.

## **5. Concluding remarks**

This study made use of recent European data (via the 2010/2011 European Social Survey) to assess the determinants of an individual participating in the political process. The rich data source presented an array of potential political activities, from voting in the electoral process, to participating in lawful public demonstrations and working in a political party or action group. This allowed categorisation of political participation (along the lines of cost and convention) into four possible outcomes: no, weak, medium, and strong participation. By then employing a generalised ordered logit model, this analysis was able to capture the non-constant impacts of determinants across the political participation hierarchy. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study to empirically inspect the changing influence of determinants across the political participation spectrum in this manner.

The rejection of the null hypothesis of proportionality of regression lines for 19 out of 24 independent variables in this analysis, indicates this is an important step forward in understanding the varying role of determinants when moving up the political participation ladder. For instance several variables were found to have a reduced influence when assessing the likelihood of moving up, when starting at no participation versus medium participation. This included age, being in a high income household, good health, being employed, and being married. In contrast, being male exhibited opposing influences on the likelihood of moving up when comparing panel (1) of no participation to panel (3) of medium participation. Males appear less likely to move out of the no participation category, relative to

females; but once on the political participation, more likely to move upwards, relative to females.

In terms of the independent variables of focus (personal values), this study lends further credence to the results of Besley (2006) in that being open to change compared to being conservative and being self-transcendent compared to self-enhancing does increase the likelihood of participation. Extending Besley's (2006) findings, being more open to change, and being more self-transcendent have differing effects across the various levels of participation. In general, there appears to be a rising influence of open to change personal values when predicting movements into stronger levels of participation, compared to simply moving from non-participation to participation. It is also interesting to note that the importance of the openness to change vs. conservation dimension appears to be of similar magnitude to the influence of the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement dimension.

A potential limitation of this study that needs to be acknowledged is the possible endogenous nature of the relationships between political interest; life satisfaction, and political participation. It is possible that while higher values of these explanatory variables are associated with increases in political participation; similarly, greater involvement in the political process may increase subjective levels of happiness, and general interest levels in political news (See Pacheco & Lange, 2010; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012). Given the focus of this study on empirically inspecting the varying influence of determinants across different levels of participation, and the specific role of personal values, attempting to check for endogeneity bias was outside the scope of this research. Additionally, such investigation will warrant the need for a suitable instrumental variable, which is a difficult task to fulfil, and hence a potential area for future research to tackle, depending on data availability.

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


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**Figure 1 – Schwartz 10 personal values continuum with four higher order values**



**Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Mean (Stddev)</b>
Political participation	Ordinal, categorical variable: 1 if no participation; 2 if weak participation; 3 if medium participation and; 4 if strong participation	2.280 (0.846)
Strong participation	Dummy variable: 1 if worked in a political party or action group in last 12 months, and/or participation in a lawful public demonstration in last 12 months; 0 = otherwise	0.090 (0.286)
Medium participation	Dummy variable: 1 if boycotted certain products in the last 12 months, signed a petition in last 12 months and/or contacted a politician, government or local government official in the last 12 months; 0 = otherwise	0.337 (0.473)
Weak participation	Dummy variable: 1 if wore or displayed campaign badge /sticker in last 12 months and/or voted in last election; 0 = otherwise	0.788 (0.409)
No participation	Dummy variable: 1 if no political participation (low, medium or strong); 0 = otherwise	0.166 (0.372)
<b>Socio-demographic</b>		
Male	Dummy variable: 1 if Male; 0 = if Female	0.460 (0.498)
Age	Age in years	50.223 (17.215)
Medium education	Dummy variable: 1 if upper secondary or post secondary (non tertiary) education; 0 = otherwise	0.525 (0.499)
High education	Dummy variable: 1 if tertiary education; 0 = otherwise	0.224 (0.417)
Immigrant	Dummy variable: 1 if person born in another country other than the one currently living in; 0 = otherwise	0.073 (0.261)
Medium household income	Dummy variable: 1 if mid range household net income from all sources; 0 = otherwise	0.423 (0.494)
High household income	Dummy variable: 1 if high range household net income from all sources; 0 = otherwise	0.246 (0.431)
Number in household	Number of people regularly living in household	2.615 (1.363)
Good health	Dummy variable: 1 if person subjectively ranked their health as good or very good; 0 otherwise	0.617 (0.486)
Employed	Dummy variable: 1 if main activity is in paid work; 0 = otherwise	0.509 (0.500)
Minority	Dummy variable: 1 if person belongs to a ethnic minority; 0 = otherwise	0.055 (0.228)
<b>Mobilisation / Recruitment</b>		
Social meetings	Ordinal, categorical variable: How often socially meets with friends, relatives or colleagues. 1 = never; 2 = less than once a month; 3 = once a month; 4 = several times a month; 5 = once a week; 6 = several times a week; 7 = every day	4.736 (1.587)
Union member	Dummy variable: 1 = has been or is a member of a trade union or similar organisation; 0 = otherwise	0.458 (0.498)
Religious activity	Dummy variable: 1 = attends religious services once a month or more; 0 = otherwise	0.244 (0.429)

Urban	Dummy variable: 1 if person stated that they live in a big city, suburbs or outside of big city, or town or small city; 0 if person stated that they live in country village or farm or home in countryside; 0 = otherwise	0.642 (0.479)	
Marital status	Dummy variable: 1 if married or in a civil union; 0 = otherwise	0.547 (0.498)	
<b>Psychological predispositions</b>			
Social trust	How much can you trust other people? Ordinal, categorical variable: 0 = can never be too careful; 10 = most people can be trusted	4.955 (2.442)	
Trust in parliament	How much can you trust parliament? Ordinal, categorical variable: 0 = no trust at all in parliament; 10 = can completely trust parliament	4.001 (2.588)	
Life satisfaction	All things considered how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Ordinal, categorical variable: 0 = completely unsatisfied; 10 = completely satisfied	6.679 (2.335)	
Political interest	Dummy variable: 1 if person is very interested or quite interested in politics; 0 = otherwise	0.480 (0.500)	
<b>Personal values</b>			
All personal values are ordinal categorical variables, ranked on a scale from 1 to 6 where 1 = if the individual believes the statement is "Not at all like me", and 6 = if the individual believes the statement is "Very much like me".			
Openness to change			
ST1	Stimulation	Likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do.	3.964 (1.368)
ST2		Looks for adventures and likes to take risks.	3.026 (1.433)
SD1	Self-direction	Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important.	4.394 (1.272)
SD2		It is important to make own decisions, ...and not depend on others.	4.794 (1.101)
Conservation			
TR1	Tradition	It is important to be humble and modest.	4.312 (1.258)
TR2		It is important to follow the customs handed down by his/her religion or family.	4.412 (1.331)
CO1	Conformity	People should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	3.926 (1.344)
CO2		It is important to always behave properly .....avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	4.483 (1.185)
SEC1	Security	Important to live in secure surroundings....avoid anything that might endanger his/her safety.	4.734 (1.209)
SEC2		Important that government ensures safety against all threats.	4.753 (1.195)
Self enhancement			
PO1	Power	Important to be rich....have a lot of money and expensive things.	2.964 (1.328)

PO2		Important to get respect from others.	3.938 (1.359)
AC1	Achievement	Important to show abilities...wants people to admire what he/she does.	3.892 (1.383)
AC2		Being successful is important...hopes people will recognise his/her achievements.	3.857 (1.349)
HE1	Hedonism	Having a good time is important...likes to spoil him/her self	4.002 (1.352)
HE2		Important to do things that give pleasure.	3.910 (1.374)
Self-transcendence			
UN1	Universalism	Everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	4.989 (1.016)
UN2		Important to listen to people who are different...even when disagrees with them.	4.644 (1.054)
UN3		Looking after the environment is important.	4.910 (1.014)
BE1	Benevolence	Important to help people around him/her.	4.874 (0.963)
BE2		Important to be loyal to his/her friends.	5.112 (0.872)

**Reference categories:** Low education, Low household income, Not employed or retired. N = 29,829

**Table 2: Gologit model**

Variables	No participation	Weak participation	Medium participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Socio-demographic</b>			
Male	-0.129*** (0.030)	0.066** (0.029)	0.322*** (0.060)
Age	0.019*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.002)
Medium education	0.178*** (0.045)	0.321*** (0.047)	0.240*** (0.061)
High education	0.639*** (0.073)	0.639*** (0.073)	0.639*** (0.073)
Medium income	0.109*** (0.033)	0.109*** (0.033)	0.109*** (0.033)
High income	0.107** (0.056)	0.153*** (0.047)	0.000 (0.056)
Number living in household	0.032** (0.015)	-0.005 (0.012)	0.034* (0.020)
Good health	0.148*** (0.044)	-0.024 (0.030)	-0.052 (0.047)
Employed	0.152*** (0.044)	0.157*** (0.036)	0.027 (0.049)
Minority	-0.001 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.052)
Immigrant	-0.898*** (0.022)	-0.264*** (0.040)	-0.247*** (0.067)
<b>Mobilisation / Recruitment</b>			
Social meet	0.091*** (0.012)	0.122*** (0.010)	0.128*** (0.017)
Union member	0.370*** (0.053)	0.193*** (0.034)	0.210*** (0.053)
Religious activity	0.370*** (0.061)	0.073** (0.034)	0.282*** (0.067)
Urban	-0.191*** (0.029)	-0.029 (0.027)	0.116*** (0.050)
Marital status	0.341*** (0.053)	0.082*** (0.033)	0.013 (0.051)
<b>Psychological predispositions</b>			
Social trust	0.111*** (0.014)	0.111*** (0.014)	0.111*** (0.014)
Political trust	0.230*** (0.022)	0.076*** (0.015)	-0.007 (0.023)
Life satisfaction	0.045*** (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.010)
Political interest	0.969*** (0.100)	0.685*** (0.055)	0.822*** (0.107)
<b>Personal values</b>			
<i>Open1</i>	0.105*** (0.014)	0.212*** (0.013)	0.135*** (0.016)
<i>Open2</i>	0.026** (0.014)	0.130*** (0.013)	0.148*** (0.020)
<i>Self1</i>	0.095*** (0.011)	0.095*** (0.011)	0.095*** (0.011)
<i>Self2</i>	0.098*** (0.014)	0.238*** (0.013)	0.137*** (0.019)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.994*** (0.045)	-2.013*** (0.014)	-3.662*** (0.004)
Number of observations	29829		
Prob > chi2	0.000		
Log likelihood	-32805.686		

**Notes:** Significance at: \*10, \*\*5, \*\*\*1 per cent levels, respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses

**Table 3: Odds ratios**

Variables	No participation (1)	Weak participation (2)	Medium participation (3)
<b>Socio-demographic</b>			
Male	0.879***	1.068**	1.380***
Age	1.019***	0.995***	0.993***
Medium education	1.195***	1.378***	1.272***
High education	1.894***	1.894***	1.894***
Medium income	1.115***	1.115***	1.115***
High income	1.113**	1.166***	1.000
Number living in household	1.033**	0.995	1.035*
Good health	1.159***	0.976	0.950
Employed	1.164***	1.170***	1.028
Minority	0.999	0.999	0.999
Immigrant	0.408***	0.768***	0.781***
<b>Mobilisation / Recruitment</b>			
Social meet	1.095***	1.130***	1.136***
Union member	1.447***	1.213***	1.234***
Religious activity	1.448***	1.076**	1.325***
Urban	0.826***	0.971	1.123***
Marital status	1.406***	1.085***	1.013
<b>Psychological predispositions</b>			
Social trust	1.117***	1.117***	1.117***
Political trust	1.258***	1.079***	0.993
Life satisfaction	1.046***	1.010	0.952***
Political interest	2.634***	1.984***	2.275***
<b>Personal values</b>			
<i>Open1</i>	1.111***	1.237***	1.144***
<i>Open2</i>	1.027**	1.139***	1.160***
<i>Self1</i>	1.100***	1.100***	1.100***
<i>Self2</i>	1.103***	1.269***	1.146***
<i>Constant</i>	0.370***	0.134***	0.026***
Number of observations	29829		
Prob > chi2	0.000		
Log likelihood	-32805.686		

Notes: Significance at: \*10, \*\*5, \*\*\*1 per cent levels, respectively.