

# THE INCONCEIVABLE

Christine **Berndt**   Francisco **de Goya**   Ronnie **van Hout**   André **Lützen**   Sara **Riel**   Peter **Robinson**

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## Preface

The exhibition, *The Inconceivable*, deals with some basic or fundamental issues that constitute our life. First of all, there is the simple but unbearable fact of death, our own termination. Even though, inescapably our life comes to an end, death is, at the same time the most unconsidered part of our existence. It is the scandal of our life, obscene, tragic and beyond comprehension. It is also something unexplorable, an experience from which we can draw no conclusions (at least this is so for people with a lack of belief in an ulterior life).

Second, and this might be even more incomprehensible, there is the fact, that - besides this final brutality, which will end our life - humans are capable of inflicting on each other incredible atrocities. The whole process of civilization seems to be about the containment of forces, both primitive and vital. Elaborate ethical and juridical structures attempt to regulate almost every aspect of our life and to prevent us from falling back in an atavistic

excess of aggression, sheer brutality and egoism. This is evidence that these forces are still strongly alive, and that the submission of individuals to civilizing processes might suppress these urges, but they are not able to change our very nature.

In *“Dialectics of Enlightenment”* (1947), Adorno and Horkheimer clearly demonstrated, that rationality, which is not the same as reason, does not necessarily lead to humanism, but instead, enabled the cruellest massacre in history, the Holocaust. It was realized in the same cold, technocratic manner as any undertaking that requires a multitude of logistics. It is especially this juridical and industrial rationality that makes it so inhuman and bestial, for what the Holocaust made so inconceivable was the simultaneity of complete lack of empathy and the lack of hate on the side of the murderers.

This means, that the hope of The Enlightenment to use rationality as a way to liberate humankind from its

self-imposed immaturity was dashed. There does not seem to be any straight way to free us from our atavistic instincts, least of all the use of reason. The explosions of aggression, the waves of outrages, which follow one after the other, leave no space for hope or for the kind of glorious aspiration for humankind that Kant had in mind. To prove this, we only need to recall the Yugoslavian war, the genocide in Rwanda, the terror in Iraq and the endless succession of violence and counter-violence in the Middle East.

The exhibition does not aim to give an encyclopaedic overview of this question, or a litany of proof to demonstrate that the process of civilization has not gone as far as we all may have hoped. It only aims to point to some aspects that can be used to consider and perhaps to conceptualise the topic in a wider framework.

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Sara Riel *Küstrin*

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## The Inconceivable


Sara Riel filmed in Küstrin, on the border between Poland and Germany, a bird, which had flown into a cord and strangled itself. The video shows, in slow-motion and in digitally manipulated colours, the final seconds of the bird's life, its flapping wings are its last attempts to escape. The terrifying effect of the film lies not only in the compelling subject matter, but also in the ambivalence it causes in the viewer. As the bird comes closer to death, its movements become slower and slower, the impression of a kind of dignity, majesty and beauty becomes stronger. It is this conflict between the aesthetical perception and our moral response to the image of the dying bird that can produce a feeling of aversion in us. We refuse to accept, that this being gains beauty while losing its life. To perceive an image as beautiful, while at the same time acknowledging that the content is utterly gruesome, goes against received concepts of aesthetics and ethics.

Peter Robinson's print from his series of binary prints, transfers a sentence by Jean-Paul Sartre into a code,

which is almost impossible to decipher for the normal reader or spectator: “One is still what one is going to cease to be and already what one is going to become. One lives one’s death, one dies one’s life.”

The chosen “image-language” corresponds to the enigmatic character of the sentence in different ways. Since the code is impossible to read, we tend to perceive it as a pure decorative pattern. At the same time, the machines, which are constructed to operate on binary codes, computers, are not able to read the image because of its non-digital (analogue) nature.

It has to be added, that the “I” and the “O” stand in Maori-mythology for “Io”, “Io-the-self-creative”, the parentless, the first parent, who was always existing without beginning or end, origin and originator, the absolute nothingness. So, the enigmatic character of Sartre’s sentence is not only represented in the doubling of “illegibility” on the visual and material level of the print, but is also forced by the crossover of “Western” (digital) culture



Peter Robinson *One lives*

and “Indigenous” culture. This results from a sheer coincidence that the visual appearance of the letters, forming the name of Io, is the same as of the numbers One and Zero, forming the nucleus of the binary code. Therefore, on several levels, an “absolute nothingness” is presented, which, depending on the way it is read, can gain and lose meaning. The process of reading can never be finished, because the image can never be understood in one way or the other.

This leads to another question the exhibition aims to raise: how and what do signifiers signify? We see André Lützen’s images of the corners of houses. They are as mundane, banal and boring as we can imagine. They gain some significance only when we learn that these photographs are taken at the edges of the former Warsaw Ghetto, where, after November 16, 1940, more than 500,000 Jewish residents of Warsaw were locked up. After April 19, 1943, the Jewish inhabitants began their fight against the Nazis. The Nazis responded by shelling

the houses block by block and rounding up or killing any Jew they could capture.

Significant resistance ended on April 23, and the uprising ended on May 16. During the fighting approximately 7,000 of the Jewish partisans were killed and 6,000 were burnt alive or gassed in bunkers. The remaining 50,000 people were sent to German death camps, mostly to Treblinka extermination camp.

The photographs by André Lützen give no suggestion as to the place where they were shot, and they do not give any hint regarding its history. By this, they raise the question, if there is any way to re-vitalize history, or to keep it alive, how long should history be preserved? To replace the former Ghetto (which was completely burned down by the Nazis) by living areas, which look as normal as any living area, means, that history is covered over, potentially erased. But, at the same time, why keep the memory of this area for ever? History goes on, doesn’t it?

Where André Lützen photographs signifiers without significance, Christine Berndt uses a historical document, to raise a similar question: How can history be revealed today? She found in an estate a letter of a Jewish woman, Salomea Rahel Ochs, who describes the effacement of the Jewish community in the Ghetto of Tarnopol in the former Ukraine. Christine Berndt asked people, who were not aware of the letter's content, to read this document. She installed the camera and a microphone and left the room, while the people started reading. Each reader was free to cancel the filming session at any time.

The viewer of the video notices slight changes of posture and hears the sighs and breathing, without knowing what the document is about. He or she can read the letter in the exhibition and will better understand the readers' reactions after that. But, despite this level of insight, does it mean that we ever will be able to understand or fully appreciate what Salomea Rahel Ochs describes in her letter? Or, that we have discovered a clue to history?



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**Christine Berndt** *The Letter of the Jewish Women*







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**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**  
*Fuerte cosa es!* (That's tough!)

The category of the “inconceivable” emerges, therefore, through different layers in Christine Berndt’s work: in our initial reaction when we watch the film, and struggle to understand the readers’ behaviours; in the letter itself where the writer uses the word “inconceivable” several times to describe her feelings regarding the massacre happening around her; and, finally, when we get a clue to the story behind the work by reading the transcription and translation of the original document, we are faced with the inconceivability of moment itself.

When we look at the two etchings by Francisco de Goya from the series of the *Desastres de la Guerra* (The Disasters of War), can we emotionally follow what the etchings depict, even when we know the historical background? The *Desastres de la Guerra* describes the occurrences during the Peninsular War between the Spanish population and the French occupiers and their mercenaries from 1808 through to 1814. Goya made this series of etchings without any intention to publish it.

The first edition was printed in 1863. In etching # 44 Goya wrote: "This is what I saw". He obviously witnessed some of the atrocities he depicted. The importance of the *Desastres de la Guerra* lies exactly in this fact: for the first time in the history of art, an artist claimed to be a witness of his time. It took another century for the artist, Otto Dix, to choose the same attitude by depicting what had happened during the First World War in his famous portfolio of prints *Der Krieg* (The War) of 1924.

The disturbing effect of Goya's images does not only lie in the gruesome subject matter, but as well - in a similar way to Sara Riel's work - in the contrast between subject matter and composition, between the aesthetical and the ethical. While the furious bearded face of the soldier in *Fuerte cosa es!* (That's tough!) is understandable, as it underlines his bestial action, the quiet, concentrated and almost satisfied, if not even happy looking faces of the men (especially of the one on the left) in *Qué hai que hacer mas?* (What more can one do?) are more difficult



**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**  
*Qué hai que hacer mas?* (What more can one do?)



**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**  
*Tampoco* (The same)

to comprehend. They look as if their actions are the most normal ones, part of their everyday business. It is this “inappropriateness” that makes Goya’s prints so horrifying. These people do not act out of rage or out of anger or fear; what they do, is their normal business.

This “inappropriateness” finds its strongest formulation in *Tampoco*, # 36 of the *Desastres de la Guerra*. A soldier watches a hanged man. His posture with the cheek nestled to the hand, is, since Albrecht Dürer’s famous copper engraving, *Melancholia I*, (1514), the traditional posture of the saturnine. Melancholia is understood as a certain state of mind to meditate on the world and not so much as a state of sadness or despair.<sup>1</sup> In Goya’s work, the stone block in the foreground often plays the role of a “stone of reflection”. In the famous etching *The Sleep of Reason* (# 43 of the *Caprichos*, published in 1799), the man, fallen asleep and threatened by creatures of the night, bats and owls, bends over a similar stone. His posture with the crossed legs is an attribute of the

representatives of The Enlightenment, as in the portrait of Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744 -1811), an author and important politician of this time (1796, Museo del Prado). Here we also find the gesture of melancholy.

Behind the hanged man in the foreground we see two more. The composition is a triangle, a classical scheme, which in the art of this time is reserved for the sublime. The contrast between the composition and the awesome subject matter reinforces the inconceivable cruelty depicted in this image, as well as the posture of melancholy and the use of the “reflection stone”. We struggle to understand how this soldier, who is obviously responsible for the deaths of the hanged men, can now sit down to contemplate. He has detached himself from the brutality of his own actions, as if he had nothing to do with their deaths, to meditate instead about the course of the world.

Why does Goya attribute to him the posture of melancholy symbolised by the “reflection stone” and



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**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**  
*El sueño de la razón produce monstruos*  
(The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters)



**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**  
*Gaspar Melchior de Jovellanos*

referred to in the context of his *oeuvre* as a positive index sign? Why does he use this classical compositional schema to depict this horrifying scene? The strong sense of ambivalence in Goya's *Tampoco* emanates from this quite horrific inversion - the brutishness of the world is inverted to become, instead, reasoned contemplation in the soldier.

The lack of hate, anger and ferocity in the latter images makes us believe that this is exactly the condition of human nature: that humankind can commit the worst excesses without any emotion, in complete clarity, in a state of reason, without being pushed by anger, threatened to death or in acts of self-defence.

Ronnie van Hout's *Charles Manson* directs us in a similar direction. It shows a head with the face of Ronnie van Hout, but bearded and with a swastika on his forehead, calmly and sadly glancing at the spectator. Charles Manson (born 1934) became famous as the leader of what was known as "The Family", a group of mainly

young men and women, mesmerised by Manson's "power". Famously, Manson was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment for the killing of Sharon Tate, her unborn baby, Leno LaBianca and his wife and others in 1969. Manson is a psychopath who not only believed he was Jesus and Satan at the same time, but that he had been especially chosen to lead a riot of the blacks against the whites. He remains today a cult figure for some. The swastika on the forehead of van Hout's work is not an invention by Ronnie van Hout, but refers to Manson's actual tattoo.

Ronnie van Hout's work effects a similar incomensurability to Goya's, the image of *Charles Manson* refers to the Christian tradition of the head of St John the Baptist, who had prophesied the appearance of Jesus Christ, baptised the Lord and was decapitated after the request of Salome to Herodes, giving her the head of St John as a reward for a dance she performed for him. In the Christian tradition the head of St John is often



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**Ronnie van Hout** *Charles Manson*



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Ronnie van Hout *Sick Child*

represented on a plate. And aside from the tradition of relics, and before Auguste Rodin had established the fragment as an autonomous form of art, the representation of St John's head was unique in the history of Western art. So, like Goya, Ronnie van Hout makes an odd inversion from the murderer to the victim, from the killer to the saint, but, at the same time, he virtually executes, in an archaic way, the death sentence Manson received but which was never enacted.

*Sick Child* by Ronnie van Hout was not modelled after an existing person, such as *Charles Manson*. Again, van Hout uses his own face to create an image of ambivalence and cryptic suffering. Staring upward, one eye open, one eye closed, dressed in pyjamas, the child-sized figure holds a broken arm in a loop, while the right hand disappears into his trousers, seemingly to touch his genitals. The fate of the *Sick Child* is unknown to us, we do not know from which sickness he is suffering. The contrast between the face of an adult and the size of a child makes us feel

uncomfortable, and we would prefer not to know what kind of pleasure he gives to himself. Obscene and poor, rebarbative and pathetic at the same time, it asks for our compassion.

Van Hout's images of distorted and deformed forms of existence, stresses the idea that we are "thrown into existence". There is a sense that the *Sick Child* is unable to change his way of life, that he is suffering from an unknown sickness but enjoying it at the same time. The repulsive image of the *Sick Child* is as disgusting as the representation of calmness and self-confidence found in *Charles Manson*. The mixture of joy and pain, self-indulgence and suffering of the *Sick Child* is as incomprehensible as Manson's psychotic ideas and actions are.

Van Hout's work meets two of the issues of *The Inconceivable*: the inscrutable fact that we are thrown into existence (from "existence to death") and the question about "true" human nature. As it is the case

with Goya, the aberrant, perverted and cruel leaves no space for any positive or humanistic ideas of human nature. The ideals of the Enlightenment are quashed by the sheer evidence that there is no progress at all in the liberation of humankind from its own immaturity. Instead only an insane, raging standstill, the invention of new tools for old atrocities.

*Leonhard Emmerling*

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1. Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art*, London 1964



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## Remnants .... Testimony

But what is it to conceive?

Would we already need to be assured of at least *that* in order to say that *this* is inconceivable? Between the conceivable and the inconceivable, how would that *between* be excavated, be understood, be conceived of?

But, what is it to conceive?

And would it be the case that the question of the condition of the work of art as such be in the region of the question of the conceivable as such? Or rather, that the question of the *between* of conceivability and the inconceivable might itself allude to the condition of possibility for the work of art? The possible convergence of two bodies of work by J.F. Lyotard is instructive here, his consideration of the postmodern and his understanding of the *differand*. With respect

to the former, Lyotard characterizes modernity's avant-gardism in relation to the bind established between the presentable and the unrepresentable, or more precisely between what is conceivable yet unrepresentable. The avant-garde, as the presentation of the new enacts this bind. What is conceived of cannot find its plane of expression outside of the formal relations of what already exists. Indeed, Lyotard precisely defines modernism in terms of the anxiety of the discovery of the presentable, and the solace found in the nostalgia for form, recourse or return to form as the condition of presentation as such. Postmodernism, for Lyotard, "in whatever age" as he likes to put it, is precisely the abandonment of nostalgia for form, and the invocation for new rules for the game of presentation as such, for presenting the unrepresentable. In part this explains Lyotard's excavation of Kant's sublime as crucially significant for the moving away from the conditions of the work as conditions secured in formal resolutions.

With respect to the latter, and in relation to his examination of Wittgenstein's understanding of language games, Lyotard developed a notion of the *differand*. In some respects the *differand* attempts to explicate the inconceivable as such in the context of dispute or agonistics. The *differand* is what we cannot agree on in a dialogical relation precisely because it is the region of a fundamental paradigmatic difference. It is where my world and yours are intrinsically different and unbridgeable. It is where whatever argument, evidence or testimony I bring to our dialogue is not recognised by you as having meaning or testimonial veracity, not because you are stubborn, nor because you are insufficiently informed, nor simply because you are argumentative, but because this empirical matter is not in your world. We cannot agree because there is something on which neither of our frameworks of judgement can agree. What I am presenting as conceivable and presentable is for you beyond conception. In his book on

the *differand*, Lyotard took as an example of such dispute the question as to whether the Holocaust in fact existed as an historical event.

The Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, in his extraordinary book, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, makes brief reference to Lyotard's *differand*, in undertaking a complex archaeology of the understanding of witness and testimony. Agamben emphasizes two etymological frameworks for understanding the conditions of the witness. One derives from a juridical framework, in the Latin *terstis*, the one who provides testimony as a third party in a dispute. This witness is neutral before the law. Agamben also emphasizes that the juridical and the ethical are radically separated, that the law is concerned with judgement, not justice, responsibility or guilt. However, there is another understanding of witness, from the Latin *superstes* or *superstite*. This witness is not neutral, is a non-judicial element, and hence not concerned with judgement.

This witness is also without authority. This witness is the survivor, and as survivor, activates the conditions of responsibility and guilt, guilt at having survived in bearing witness to those who did not and responsibility as the guarantor for the testimony of those who did not survive. Responsibility, Agamben explains, comes from the Latin *spondeo*: to become the guarantor of something for someone (or for oneself) with respect to someone. As survivor, this witness bears testimony to what is radically absent, missing testimony. This witness presents an event without witnesses. This survivor presents the logical paradox of Lyotard's *differand*: if this survivor is truly a witness to those who did not survive, this witness should not have survived to bear witness. It presents the conditions of survival as such, neither inside the event, such that one perishes, nor outside the event such that one would find it's taking place inconceivable. One witnesses an event without witnesses. This is the

presentation of conceivability as such, its condition and *aporia*, between the impossibility of bearing witness and the responsibility to bear witness. In what language does the inconceivable conceive of itself? And how would this language as such not be taken over by the anxiety of presentation, not be subsumed in nostalgia and solace in devising the conditions of good form? And how do we encounter testimony, read it, hear it and see it, beyond all the ruses, doxas and conventions of good digestion, beyond the curatives thrown our way to satisfy that appetite for something more?

*The trace of that to which no one has borne witness, which language believes itself to transcribe, is not the speech of language. The speech of language is borne where language is no longer in the beginning, where language falls away from it simply to bear witness: "It was not light, but was sent to bear witness to the light."*

(Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 39)

Kantian aesthetics does not sever itself entirely from classical mimesis. The originary model of the work of art remains the work of nature as that which bears witness to God's design. If there is the possibility of the human artefact considered as a work of art, it is because its design is above all mimetic of nature, but not nature as an end or necessity, but purely nature as design, as an end or finality in God's infinite design. Hence, the artefactual considered as a work of art, is in Kant's terms, "purposive without purpose" which means the work as such bears witness to human design but the work has no end, finality or purpose outside of this. Kant conceives of the work of art severed from a world of understanding or moral judgement. More acutely, he surmised the possibility of the artwork as that which may bridge the abyss separating understanding from moral judgement. Its provenance or domain is that of subjective 'feeling' of pleasure in the beautiful or dread in the sublime, and may interestingly be related to concerns of the utilitarian

philosophers associated with Jeremy Bentham. While Kant rigorously maintains that the work of art determined in reflective judgement is without finality or end, there is clearly finality or purpose when we consider the supposed universality of agreement as condition of the artwork as such, a universality of subjective feeling. This is Kant's *sensus communis*, a community of sensibility, which for Kant becomes the highest expression of human community, as it is a being-in-common of neither universal agreement on understanding, nor universal accession to moral imperatives, but a universality of subjective feeling. Kant understood that such universality was an ideal, conceivable but not realizable. For this reason, one could never be done with discussing the work of art, whether or not it was or was not a work of art. Its condition of existence was that of a veritable escalator of babble, discussion, agreement or disagreement concerning subjective feeling. Nothing was decidable as there was no rule for making the work of art. Culture,

for Kant, had its highest expression in this free exchange on the matter of subjective feeling in the construal of a community whose aim in its being in common was not the eventual decisiveness of its unanimity, but the heterodoxy of its differences. In this sense, art did have its polity, its politics and its finality or end.

Yet we are aware of the difficulty of this terrain that attempts to bring aesthetics and politics into a neighbourhood. Walter Benjamin's seminal essay on the artwork in the age of mechanical reproducibility has already drawn the sharp distinction between a political aesthetics and the aestheticisation of politics. For Benjamin the necessity for this distinction was survival in the lifeworld of fascism. Perhaps one needs to delineate three regions that require sharp differentiation as well as necessary recognition of blurrings and crossovers. One region would concern the politicization of aesthetics, recognition that the work of art in whatever age, with or without 'aura', as 'cult value' or 'exhibition value'

requires an analytics of relations of power or force, as that which is productive of the work's modes of appearance. This essential mode of analysis is as necessary in accounting for the works made visible in the exhibition *The Inconceivable*, as in accounting for marginal spaces of exhibition or even spaces of exclusion. The second arena would be concerned with the non-neutrality of all exhibition work, that just as there are relations of force that productively enable appearance, so too, the work exhibited implicitly or explicitly engages with these conditions of production, and the accessions to revealing or concealing those forces that enable its conditions of possibility. One might say, after Foucault, that in as much as a work aims at making visible the relations of power of its own production, it is resistive, and approaches to some extent how Benjamin understood a political aesthetics, at least that suggested in his "Author as Producer." The third arena is the aestheticisation of politics, which for Benjamin concerned how the masses, in a state of

distraction as the modern condition of the *socius*, had the unanimity of their community of sensibility guaranteed by designed appearance, under the aphoristic dialectic at a standstill, gleaned from Baudelaire: the new as the ever same ... fashion and death. The aestheticisation of politics constitutes the banality and obscenity of the global escalation of fascism throughout the twentieth century, under emancipatory politics of capital's capacity to deliver a designed and ordered life, universal, indifferent to difference other than designed difference. It is for this reason that we are particularly cautious of the aestheticised politics of political aesthetics, the designed consumption of resistance.

But perhaps this today is the inconceivable as such: that there is nothing inconceivable. Already too much a modernist response and understanding, we rephrase it: *nothing is conceivable*, and play on the double genitive, the undecidability of the "of." Would it mean that the human and the artificial are no longer distinguishable as

to their irreducible difference with respect to conception? Or would it mean that the human is now presented a threshold of its being human in the revealing of the nothing that it is with respect to its being, that it wasn't destined to be nor not to be, but rather that it may become reconciled with its potential to not be. It is perhaps our fate to be living the times of this acute undecidability, between the prosthetic and the nothing, and it is perhaps a task of the artwork, exemplified with *The Inconceivable*, to present this aporia. If this is too grand a pronouncement, then we may consider how these things exhibited in their various languages bear witness not so much to history, but more to the revealing of how guilt and responsibility are outside of the law, neither transgressive nor non-transgressive, how we become that someone whom the guarantor addresses as witness, in one way or another, to an event without witnesses, and how these things exhibited show the trace

of a non-language in which language is born. To have recourse here to the sublime or even the unrepresentable would be to already have recourse to the good form of well-chosen philosophemes. Rather, and in a gesture at the neutralization of aesthetics, we might simply invoke that gray zone alluded to by Agamben in *Remnants of Auschwitz*, that zone where victims have become executioners and executioners have become victims.

Mark Jackson  
16 June 2006

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## Image credits

**Sara Riel**

*Küstrin*, 2004  
video on DVD  
courtesy of the artist

**Peter Robinson**

*One lives*, 2006  
lambda print, 212 x 120 cm  
courtesy Sue Crockford Gallery, Auckland

**Christine Berndt**

*The Letter of the Jewish Women*, 2003/2004  
video on DVD  
courtesy of the artist

**André Lützen**

*Warsaw*, 2003  
18 photographs  
courtesy of the artist

**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**

*Fuerte cosa es!* (That's tough!)  
etching, aquatint, drypoint  
courtesy Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tamaki, purchased 1981

**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**

*Que hai que hacer mas?* (What more can one do?)  
etching with aquatint and drypoint  
courtesy Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tamaki, purchased 1955

**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**

*Tampoco* (The Same)  
etching and aquatint  
courtesy Pfalzgalerie Kaiserslautern

**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**

*El sueño de la razon produce Monstruos*  
(The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters)  
etching and aquatint  
courtesy Pfalzgalerie Kaiserslautern

**Francisco José de Goya y Lucientes**

*Gaspar Melchar de Jovellanos*, 1798  
oil on canvas, 205 x 133 cm  
courtesy Museo del Prado, Madrid

**Ronnie van Hout**

*Charles Manson*, 2003  
mixed media  
courtesy of the artist

**Ronnie van Hout**

*Sick Child*, 2006  
mixed media  
courtesy of the artist

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